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Patch by Patch: North Carolina's Crazy Quilt of
Campaign Finance Regulations
ABSTRACT

After more than a decade of judicial intervention and legislative
reforms, North Carolina'scampaignfinance laws resemble a crazy quilta patchwork of provisionspieced togetherfrom remnants and scraps. The
law is a dizzying array of proscriptions, requirements, and exceptions,
sometimes based on speaker identity and sometimes based on the content
or context of the political message. This quilt is what remained after the
Fourth Circuit's strained and confusing decision in North Carolina Right
to Life, Inc. v. Leake, decided in 2008, immediatelyfollowing the Supreme
Court's landmark decision in McConnell v. FEC. This Comment evaluates
and summarizes North Carolina'sexisting campaignfinance regulations,
provides a critical analysis of both the state of the law and of the Fourth
Circuit's decision in North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, and offers

a suggested analyticalframework for future judicial review of campaign
finance regulations.
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A.

INTRODUCTION

Modem political campaigns are dominated by political ads and the
money required to produce and air them. Candidates and Political Action
Committees break new fundraising records every election cycle.' By July
31, 2016, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, along with their Super PACs
and party committees, raised over $1 billion for the 2016 presidential
contest. 2 Here in North Carolina in the same period, candidates for state
and local races raised more than $38 million.' Independent political groups
spent another $33.1 million, with more than $16 million spent on the
gubernatorial race alone.'
Campaign finance regulations seek to ensure that candidates raising
such large sums of money are not doing so in exchange for political favors,
and if they are, that the public has sufficient information available to hold
them accountable. These regulations pose a tricky balancing act for the
federal and state governments. Political speech is vital to our democracy
and has been the bedrock of our nation's history.' Citizens expect the

1. Paul Blumenthal, Get Ready for the Most Expensive Senate Races of All Time,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 30, 2016, 4:11 AM), https://perma.cc/A85U-4ZWQ.
2. Anu Narayanswamy, Darla Cameron & Matea Gold, Campaign 2016: Money
Raisedas ofJuly 31, WASH. POST (July 31, 2016), https://perma.cc/VB3Y-TF7Q.
3. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, North Carolina, State Summary, 2016 Cycle,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://perma.cc/A6G7-K2EW.
4. Alex Kotch, North Carolina's 2016 State Elections Smashed Outside Spending
Records, FACING SOUTH (Feb. 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/T8VK-63ZE.
5. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The
Founders
believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth .... They knew ...
that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol40/iss2/9

2

Stearns: Patch by Patch: North Carolina's Crazy Quilt of Campaign Finance

2018]

PATCH BY PATCH

671

greatest freedom when they engage in political speech. But, for the last
century, free-flowing political discourse has had to yield to protections
against the threat of corruption. As candidates continue to appeal to
anonymous donors who pour millions of dollars into state and national
campaigns, the public is apt to suspect that political favors will be
exchanged for those donations. When the public perceives corruption in
the political process, distrust of government often follows, and that can be
as damaging to our system of government as the constraint of speech.
As a result, federal and state governments have sought to carefully
thread the needle-permitting the broadest free speech possible while also
ensuring that campaign contributions do not result in corruption or
seriously undermine the public's confidence in our electoral system. That
struggle has resulted in a set of regulations and exceptions so confusing
that an average citizen could easily run afoul of the law without ever
intending to do so. 6 As the Fourth Circuit noted:
It is no unfounded fear that one day the regulation of elections may
resemble the Internal Revenue Code, and that impossible complexity may
take root in the very area where freedom from intrusive governmental
oversight should matter most." 7

If we have not yet reached that day, it is fast approaching.
For more than a decade, North Carolina has made piecemeal revisions
to its campaign finance laws, amending, repealing, or replacing sections of
the law in response to court orders.' The result is a code that has lost its
original purpose. It is a quilt stitched together without a pattern. The
average citizen is left unsure what the law is, with his speech chilled by the
threat of criminal sanction if he fails to adequately understand how to
comply with the law. In its current form, North Carolina's campaign
the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and
proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
Id.
6. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 335-36 (2010) (holding that the Federal
Election Commission's two-part, eleven-factor balancing test amounted to a prior restraint
on speech because an average speaker who desired to avoid criminal liability would need to
ask the government whether his speech was regulated).
7. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL Ill), 525 F.3d 274, 296 (4th Cir. 2008).
8. See Act of May 4, 1999, no. 31, 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 34 (revising the definition of
"political committee" in response to the holding in N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168
F.3d 705, 712-13 (4th Cir. 1999)); Act of Aug. 19, 2007, no. 391, § 3, 2007 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1150, 1152 (repealing the $3,000 rebuttable presumption that had previously been
used to classify issue advocacy after the test was held unconstitutional in N.C. Right to Life,
Inc. v. Leake, 344 F.3d 418, 430 (4th Cir. 2003)); Act of Aug. 2, 2008, no. 150, 2008 N.C.
Sess. Laws 605 (titled in part as "An Act .. . to Respond to the Decision of the 4th Circuit
U.S. Court of Appeals in North Carolina Right to Life v. Leake").
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finance regulations fail to accomplish the government's goals of
encouraging political participation while limiting the possibility and
perception of corruption.
This Comment will begin by providing an overview of North
Carolina's campaign finance regime, explaining which individuals and
organizations are subject to regulation and which types of speech are
subject to regulation. It will also explain how the North Carolina Board of
Elections 9 uses disclosure reporting requirements along with civil and
criminal penalties to fulfill its duty to regulate campaign finance.
Part II offers a critique of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision in North CarolinaRight to Life, Inc. v. Leake,10 which struck two
provisions of North Carolina's campaign finance laws as facially
unconstitutional. Rather than analyzing the law's ability to achieve a
governmental interest without burdening constitutionally protected speech,
the court subjected the law to bright-line tests that it incorrectly adopted
and applied.
Part m proposes a framework for future review of challenges to
campaign finance regulations. This framework suggests that the court
proceed by (1) identifying the type of burden imposed by the regulation, (2)
selecting the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny, (3) determining
whether the method of regulation chosen is capable of achieving that stated
purpose, and (4) determining whether the law incidentally burdens
protected speech that the government need not regulate in order to
accomplish its purpose. Finally, the court should assess the law for
vagueness under both the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
This Comment concludes by asserting that what remains of North
Carolina's campaign finance regime is incapable of achieving the

9. On December 16, 2016, the Bi-Partisan Ethics, Elections and Court Reform Act
was enacted and signed by outgoing Governor Pat McCrory. S. 4, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 4th
Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016). The Act combined the North Carolina Board of Elections and the
North Carolina Ethics Commission into a new board designated The North Carolina
Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement. The incoming Governor, Roy
Cooper, challenged the new act and a preliminary injunction was issued blocking all
portions of the law from taking effect. Cooper v. Berger, No. 16 CVS 15636, 2017 WL
1433242 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 2017). The Act was repealed and replaced by the
Bipartisan Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement Act five months later. S. 68, 2017
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017). The portions of the Act which provided for the
composition of the new board were found unconstitutional by the North Carolina Supreme
Court. Cooper v. Berger, 809 S.E.2d 98 (N.C. 2018). The legislature again sought to
combine the board and commission immediately following the court's holding. H.B. 90,
2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2018). For the sake of clarity, throughout this Article
the board is referred to as the Board of Elections.
10. NCRLHI, 525 F.3d 274.
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governmental interest that is purportedly the justification for its existence.
Instead, the law unconstitutionally chills free speech. The resulting
patchwork of regulation is so complex that an average citizen cannot
understand it and, without the assistance of an attorney, could face criminal
penalties for innocently violating the law through the simple act of
collectively associating and advocating for a candidate.
I.

NORTH CAROLINA'S CAMPAIGN FINANCE SCHEME

North Carolina's statutory scheme for regulating campaign finance
restricts political speech in three primary ways. It imposes restrictions on
the basis of the speaker's identity; it imposes restrictions on the basis of the
content of certain messages; and it imposes disclosure requirements on
The statute uses civil and criminal
certain speakers and messages.
penalties to enforce the law. The following sections will summarize those
restrictions, requirements, and penalties.
A.

Restrictions Imposed on the Basis of Speaker Identity

North Carolina's statutes identify seven types of speakers subject to
13
regulation: (1) individuals," (2) candidates, 12 (3) for-profit corporations,
(4) non-profit corporations,14 (5) segregated funds created by corporations
or labor unions,15 (6) political parties and their affiliated party
committees,' 6 and (7) any other organization which has "the major purpose
to support or oppose" the nomination, election, or defeat of a candidate
7
The
(political action committees, colloquially known as PACs).1
regulations impose different burdens on the different types of speakers,

11. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163A-1410 to -1505 (2017) ("Regulating
Contributions and Expenditures in Political Campaigns"). Registered lobbyists are subject
to more stringent regulations. Id § 163A-1427. Discussion of the constitutionality of these
restrictions is beyond the scope of this Comment; however, for a more thorough discussion
on the constitutionality of these restrictions, see NC. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 3 F.
Supp. 2d 675 (E.D.N.C. 1998).
12. §§ 163A-1411(9),-1475(2).
13. Id. §§ 163A-1411(24), -1436.
14. Id § 163A-1436(h).
15. Id § 163A-1436(g); see also id § 163A-1436(d).
16. Id §§ 163A-1411(76), -1416 to -1417.
The statute defines a political committee as "a
17. Id. § 163A-1411(74)(d).
combination of two or more individuals ... that makes ... contributions or expenditures
and has . . . the major purpose to support or oppose the nomination or election of one or
more clearly identified candidates." Id § 163A-1411(74).
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with some subject to very stringent regulation and others provided great
latitude to raise and spend funds to further their political messages.
Individual donors may not contribute more than $5,200 per election
cycle to any candidate or political committee.18 Because the statutes treat
"coordinated expenditures" (purchases that are made in concert or
agreement with the candidate) as donations, individuals who collaborate
with a candidate to make purchases, as opposed to direct donations, must
treat those expenditures as donations subject to the contribution limit.1 9
For-profit corporations are prohibited from making campaign
contributions, 20 but this does not mean they are prohibited from
participating in the political process. They may encourage their employees,
stockholders, or members to register and vote, 21 and they may advocate for
or against a candidate so long as the expenditure is not coordinated with the
campaign.22 They may also directly support candidates by establishing "a
separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes."2 3 The
segregated fund can make contributions to candidates or other political
committees and engage in electioneering. 24 The restrictions on corporate
contributions do not apply to non-profit corporations, 25 which are free to
make contributions to candidates and political committees, subject to the
$5,200 cap per election cycle. 26
The statutes also regulate political committees and require that every
candidate must establish and register a "political committee" with the
18. Id. § 163A-1425(a). The limit is adjusted for inflation every two years. Id.
§ 163A-1425(b).
19. Id. § 163A-1411(20). "'[C]oordinated expenditure' means an expenditure that is
"

made in concert or cooperation with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate ....
Id. The precise level of coordination required has yet to be established in North Carolina
courts, but federal courts have held coordination in the context of federal campaign finance
laws to mean "the candidate or her agents can exercise control over, or where there has been
substantial discussion or negotiation between the campaign and the spender over, a
communication's: (1) contents; (2) timing; (3) location, mode, or intended audience ... ; or
(4) 'volume."' FEC v. Christian Coal., 52 F. Supp. 2d 45, 92 (D.D.C. 1999).
20. § 163A-1436(a).
21. Id. § 163A-1436(d).
22. See id § 163A-1436. While corporations are prohibited from making contributions,
the definition of "contribution" expressly excepts independent expenditures.
Id. § 163A-1411(13).
23. Id. § 163A-1436(d).
24. Id. The corporation may provide administrative support to its segregated fund but
must report the value of that support, as well as a portion of the salary of any officer or
employee who works for the segregated fund, as a contribution from the parent corporation.
Id. § 163A-1436(g).
25. Id § 163A-1436(h).
26. Id. § 163A-1425(a).
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Once registered, the political committee is subject to several
state.
special requirements. It must:
(1)appoint a treasurer,2 8
(2)disclose the location and account information of all bank accounts
and loans, 29
(3)file periodic detailed accountings of receipts and expenditures, 30
(4)abide by certain fundraising and expenditure limitations, 3 and
(5)not receive or solicit donations of more than $5,200 per election
from any donor.32
Political parties, their affiliated party committees, and other
committees controlled by them are exempted from many of North
Carolina's campaign finance regulations. Political parties are not subject
to the donation cap 34 and can make contributions to or expenditures on
behalf of candidates in unlimited amounts; they can also receive donations
in unlimited amounts.35 Political parties are also authorized to establish
separate "headquarters building funds" to be used for the purchase and
maintenance of physical office space.36 Donations to the "building fund do

27. Id. §§ 163A-1411(74),-1418(a)(1).
28. Id. § 163A-1412(a).
29. Id. §§ 163A-1412(b)(8), -1422.
30. See id § 163A-1414(a) (requiring detailed accounts current within seven days); id
§ 163A-1418 (establishing reporting periods for various election cycles); id § 163A-1422
(setting out information that must be included in periodic reports).
31. Id. § 163A-1425.
32. Id. §§ 163A-1425(a), (c). This cap is waived for the candidate and his or her
spouse, who can contribute unlimited funds to the campaign. Id. § 163A-1425(d).
33. Id. § 163A-1411(76). The definition of "political committee" includes the "political
party or [its] executive committee," as well as any committee controlled by it. Id.
§ 163A-1411(74)(b). This includes the state, county, and congressional district committees
of each party, as well as the caucuses of each party (e.g., the Democratic Women or the
Young Republicans) and the affiliated committees, (e.g., the Senate Democrats, the
Republican Council of State), which are referred to collectively throughout this Comment as
"political parties."
34. Id § 163A-1425(h).
35. The political parties are subject to federal contribution limits. Federal Elections
Campaign Act of 1971, 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(D) (Supp. IV 2017). No person may
contribute in excess of $10,000 "to a political committee established and maintained by a
State committee of a political party in any calendar year." Id The parties may, however,
separate their finances into a federal fund and a state fund, and the state fund may accept
donations above the federal donation limit. See 11 C.F.R. § 106.6 (2018).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163A-1438.
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not constitute contributions or expenditures" and therefore are not subject
to any contribution regulations, including the ban on corporate giving.3
Finally, the statutes regulate a "catch-all" category of political
speakers: those who engage in electoral advocacy but are not controlled by
candidates or political parties-PACs. Understanding this category of
regulated speakers requires a more detailed breakdown of the definition of
"political committee."
The statute defines "political committee" as any combination of two
or more people, business entities, or organizations "that makes . .
contributions or expenditures and has . . . the major purpose to support or
oppose the nomination or election of one or more clearly identified
candidates." 3 8 "Contribution" and "expenditure" are defined to include
anything of value given to, or made in coordination with, a candidate,
political committee, or political party "to support or oppose the nomination
or election of one or more clearly identified candidates." 39 The phrase "to
support or oppose" is a term of art, which appears throughout the statutory
scheme. 4 0 The statute provides a list of particular words and phrases that
show "an individual or other entity acted 'to support or oppose the
nomination or election of one or more clearly identified candidates. ""
In short, a "political committee" is a combination of individuals or
entities whose major purpose is to either: (1) make contributions to
candidates or political committees, (2) make expenditures that are
coordinated with a candidate or political committee, or (3) engage in
electoral advocacy by communicating messages to the public that, in

37. Id. The statute provides that if the party (1) establishes a "separate segregated bank
account," (2) informs donors that funds will be used exclusively for the headquarters
building, and (3) ensures all donations are designated for the building fund, its receipts and
expenses are not deemed "contributions" or "expenditures." Id §§ 163A-1438(2)-(3).
Notwithstanding that exemption, the party is required to report donations to and spending by
the building fund to the Board of Elections. Id. § 163A-1438(5).
38. Id § 163A-1411(74). The statute also provides that a candidate who serves as his
own treasurer, and is therefore a committee of one, is still subject to regulation as a
"political committee." Id.
39. Id. § 163A-1411(13), (51). The definition of "expenditure" includes a slight
variation from the language used to define "contribution." That definition encompasses
"anything of value ... to support or oppose the nomination, election, or passage of one or
more clearly identified candidates, or ballot measure." Id § 163A-1411(51).
40. See id §§ 163A-1410 to -1505.
41. Id § 163A-1429(a). The list is an adaptation of the list originally supplied by the
Supreme Court in its landmark decision, Bucidey v. Valeo, and includes "vote for,"
"reelect," "support," "vote against," "defeat," etc. Id; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44
n.52 (1976) (per curiam).
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express terms, advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate.4 2
Classification as a political committee subjects the organization to each of
the requirements enumerated above for candidates' political committees
and means that all financial information will become public record,
including the names, addresses, occupations, and employers of all
supporters.4 3
The statutes provide an exception for a special subset of these
committees, called independent expenditure political committees, because
they "do[] not ... make contributions, directly or indirectly, to candidates
or to political committees that make contributions to candidates."44 These
special committees must adhere to all of the reporting and disclosure
requirements for other political committees but are exempt from campaign
contribution limits. 4 5 In exchange for giving up the right to make
contributions to candidates or coordinate their expenditures with
candidates, they can raise funds in unlimited amounts from individuals,
non-profit corporations, or political parties.
An example may be helpful in illustrating the difference in the two
types of political committees. Imagine a group of neighbors who want to
work together to support Ben Franklin in his run for the North Carolina
Senate. They could form a PAC: Citizens for Ben. This PAC would be
regulated as a political committee, and the neighbors would have to comply
with all of the provisions of Article 22A of the North Carolina General
Statutes. If they tell Ben they plan to mail flyers that say "Vote for Ben!"
to all of the scientists in his district, the money spent on the flyers would be
treated as a donation to Ben because his knowledge of the mailer has value
to him. It was coordinated. He now knows that he can shift campaign
funds away from contacting the scientists in his district and can use those
resources in other areas. This "coordinated expenditure" would have to be
reported by Ben as an in-kind donation from the PAC. Because it is
considered a donation, it is subject to the $5,200 contribution limitation,
meaning the PAC would have to spend less than $5,200 to design, print and
mail the flyer. If, however, the neighbors send the mailer without
consulting Ben, the same flyer is treated as an "independent expenditure,"
which is by definition not a donation and therefore not subject to the
42. §§ 163A-1411(74), -1429. To satisfy this prong, the communication must include
one of the words or phrases listed in section 163A-1429.
43. See id §§ 163A-1412, -1414, -1425.
44. Id § 163A-1425(j); see also id § 163A-1411(13) (exempting independent
expenditures from the definition of contribution); id § 163A-1411(53) (defining
An expenditure is "independent" if it is made without
independent expenditure).
coordinating with the candidate, generally without his or her direction or input. Id
45. Id § 163A-1425().
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contribution limit. If the neighbors decide at the outset to never collaborate
with Ben or make any donations to candidates, their PAC is an
"independent expenditure political action committee"-a Super PAC-that
can raise and spend unlimited money for their effort.
To recap, candidates may not accept more than $5,200 from a single
donor in a given election cycle and cannot accept donations from for-profit
corporations. Political parties may solicit and accept unlimited donations
from individuals but may only solicit or accept contributions from forprofit corporations if those funds are used solely for a "building fund."
While for-profit corporations may not contribute to candidates or PACs
(other than political party building funds), they may establish segregated
funds to do so and may provide administrative support and staff to the
segregated fund. Non-profit corporations may make contributions to
candidates and other political committees. Any other group whose "major
purpose" is expressly advocating for the election or defeat of a candidate
must register as a political committee and comport with all attendant
regulatory requirements, including the limitation on contributions. If a
political committee certifies that it will not make contributions to
candidates, it is exempt from the contribution limits and may raise
unlimited funds from its donors.
B.

Restrictions Imposed on the Basis ofMessage Content

North Carolina also imposes restrictions based on the content of
political messages.46 Political communications can be classified along a
spectrum, with "express advocacy" at one end, "issue advocacy" at the
other, and the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy occupying some
amount of space in the middle.47 Messages that clearly call for a vote for or
against a particular candidate are express advocacy, while those that seek to
inform or persuade the public about a particular policy are issue
advocacy.48
Early regulatory schemes classified express advocacy as those
messages that used certain "magic words." The list was first formulated in
the landmark Buckley v. Valeo decision and included words like "vote for,"

46. See id §§ 163A-1410 to -1505.
47. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003) (explaining how the sharp
distinction between express and issue advocacy led to the rise of communications that
eschewed the use of "magic words" while still advocating the election or defeat of a
candidate), overruled in part on other grounds by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010).
48. Id
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"support," "vote against" or "defeat."4 9 The use of such a finite list made
it easy for political advertisers to disguise their express advocacy as issue
advocacy and thereby avoid regulation." Courts have come to refer to ads
that skirt regulation by avoiding the listed magic words as the functional
equivalent of express advocacy.5
For instance, the Citizens for Ben PAC might purchase advertising
space on a billboard that says "Vote for Ben!" That message would be a
clear example of express advocacy. A billboard that read "Ben supports
fewer restrictions on kites" would lie at the other end of the spectrum and
be categorized as issue advocacy. While the speaker might intend to
support Ben by appealing to kiting enthusiasts, the objective purpose is to
inform the public about Ben's position on kiting restrictions. But, what if
the PAC ran a television ad the week before the election that showed Ben
braving a storm, kite in hand, while a voiceover proclaims "Ben Franklin,
the only candidate willing to brave storms to make our state better"? The
language of the ad avoids the magic words but is clearly intended to
support the candidate. In North Carolina, this ad would only be subject to
regulation if it qualifies as an "electioneering communication"-North
Carolina's analogue for the functional equivalent of express advocacy.52
A message is an electioneering communication under North
Carolina's statute only if it:
(1) does not contain express advocacy;5 3
(2) is a broadcast, cable or satellite communication, mass mailing, or
telephone bank; 5 4

49. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44, n.52 (1976) (per curiam). The Buckley Court
narrowed the application of a federal statute such that it would only apply "to
communications containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as 'vote
for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,'
'reject."' Id These were quickly adopted in both federal and state law as a clear means of
regulating campaign messages. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126-29.
50. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126-29.
51. Id.; see e.g., Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 132 (2d Cir. 2014)
(explaining that disclosure requirements need not "be limited to speech that is the functional
equivalent of express advocacy" (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369)); Nat'l Org. for
Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 68 (1st Cir. 2011) (discussing McConnell's functional
equivalent test).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163A-1411(41) (2017).
53. Id. § 163A-1411(43)(b). "[C]ommunication[s] that constitute[] an expenditure or
independent expenditure" are specifically exempted from the definition. Id
54. Id. § 163A-1411(41). The definition identifies four modes of communication:
radio, television, mass mailings, and telephone banks. Id The enumeration of certain
modes of communication necessarily precludes its application to others-expressiounius est
exclusio alterius. Consequently, Internet communications are left wholly unregulated
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(3) which refers to a clearly identified candidate;5
(4) is transmitted during the specified time period;16
(5) is received by the requisite number of people or households; 7 and
(6) does not fall within the list of enumerated exceptions.
So, if the Citizens for Ben PAC were to run its ad on local television the
week before the election, it would be regulated as an electioneering
communication if it reached at least 7,500 people, despite the fact that it is
not express advocacy and is not coordinated with the campaign. That same
ad appearing on television in August would not be subject to regulation.
A message that is not an "electioneering communication" is regulated
only if it contains words of express advocacy. When the production or
distribution of such an ad is coordinated with a candidate, it is treated as a
contribution to the candidate and is subject to contribution limits. 5 9 If the
communication contains express advocacy but is not coordinated with the
candidate, it is an "independent expenditure" and is not subject to
contribution limits. 60 Any political message that does not contain express
during the electioneering window. Id § 163A-1429(b)(3). In fact, the word "Internet" only
appears one time in the entire chapter, in an exception to the definition of express
advocacy-"a communication shall not be subject to regulation ... if it: .. . [i]s distributed
... through the Internet." Id. The definition also fails to include billboard and print media
advertising and further expressly excludes telephone banks when calls are made by
volunteers. Id § 163A-1411(93).
55. Id. § 163A-1411(41)(a).
56. Id § 163A-1411(41)(b).
57. Id. § 163A-1411(41). Advertisements for candidates for statewide office made by
broadcast, cable, or satellite transmission must be received by at least 50,000 individuals to
meet the requirement. Id. Ads distributed by mass mailing or telephone bank for candidates
for statewide office must be received by 20,000 households. Id Advertisements for
candidates for local office transmitted by broadcast, cable, or satellite must be received by at
least 7,500 individuals, or 2,500 households if distributed by mass mailing or telephone
bank. Id.
58. Id § 163A-1411(43). The statute exempts the following:
1.
News, commentary, or editorials distributed by a broadcasting station not
owned by a political party, political committee or candidate;
2.
Printed news stories;
3.
Debates and promotions of debates;
4.
Ads calling on the public to lobby a representative to support or oppose
specific legislation pending before the general assembly while it is in session;
5.
Commercial ads that do not mention the election and do not take a position
on a candidate's character; and
6.
Public opinion polls.
Id
59. Id. § 163A-1411(20); see supra text accompanying note 19.
60. § 163A-1411(53).
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advocacy and is not an "electioneering communication" is not subject to
regulation or disclosure, even if coordinated with a candidate or political
committee.6 1
C.

DisclosureRequirements Imposed on CertainSpeakers

The purposes of North Carolina's campaign finance statutes are
accomplished in large part through the reporting requirements. All political
committees are required to file periodic reports with the Board of
Elections. 62 These reports must include detailed information about each
receipt and expenditure.6 3 The statute also imposes disclosure requirements
for anyone who makes independent expenditures that exceed $10064 or

61. 30 N.C. Reg. 721 (Oct. 1, 2015) (advisory opinion of Kim Strach, Executive
Director of the North Carolina State Board of Elections). The Executive Director of North
Carolina's State Board of Elections confirmed that entities other than political committees
can coordinate issue advocacy with candidates, provided that those communications do not
constitute electioneering communications. Id "[P]ayments for those communications
cannot be deemed 'coordinated expenditures' or 'contributions."' Id. at 722. Because the
request for the opinion was limited to organizations that are not political committees, the
opinion was also limited. Id There is, however, no reason to believe the same opinion
would not apply to political committees or individuals when they engage in activity that
constitutes only the coordination of issue advocacy. Id; see also Tom Bullock, Open the
Floodgates? NC Political Candidates, Outside Groups Can Coordinate, WFAE (Nov. 27,
2015), https://perma.cc/R9FL-2377.
62. § 163A-1418. The frequency of reports varies depending on whether the filing is
done in the year of the general election or in the year of the municipal elections. Id Certain
candidates are required to file reports with County Boards of Election rather than the State
Board of Elections. Id §§ 163A-1495 to -1500. Candidates for certain offices who certify
they will not raise or spend more than $1,000 are exempt from reporting requirements. Id
§ 163A-1421. The statute further provides that "[t]he exemption ... applies to political
party committees and affiliated party committees under the same terms as for candidates."
Id. § 163A-1421(b).
63. Id § 163A-1422(a). The statute requires that the report identify the name, address,
profession, and employer of each contributor, as well as the date and amount of the
donation. Id § 163A-1422(a)(1). Additionally, the report must include the name and
address of the payee and purpose of each expenditure, as well as the amount and date that
the expense was paid or incurred. Id § 163A-1422(a)(2). For donations under fifty dollars,
there is no requirement to disclose the name, address, and occupation of the donor. Id.
§ 163A-1422(b).
64. Id § 163A-1423(a). The report is due within thirty days of the date it surpasses the
$100 threshold or ten days before the election, whichever first occurs. Id § 163A-1423(d).
Once the initial report is filed, subsequent reports must be filed according to the schedule for
political committees. Id § 163A-1423(e). Expenditures of more than $5,000 made between
the last required filing and election day must be disclosed within forty-eight hours. Id
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spends more than $5,000 for the production or airing of electioneering
communications. 65
Electioneering communication reports must include significantly more
information than independent expenditures reports.66 The electioneering
communication report must, in addition to disclosing the amount paid and
to whom, disclose the filer's principal place of business and identify who
incurred the expense, who directs the activities of the filer, and who keeps
the books and accounts.6 ' Additionally, the disclosure must include the
name of any candidate(s) identified in the communication and the election
to which it pertains. 68 Finally, it must identify anyone who donated more
than $1,000 to further the electioneering communication.69
Whether a particular expenditure must be disclosed depends on the
identity of the purchaser, the content of the message, and whether that
message is coordinated with a candidate or political committee. The
following table helps summarize these different reporting requirements for
expenditures by different speakers for various types of messages:

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. § 163A-1424.
See id § 163A-1424(a).
Id. §§ 163A-1424(a)(1)-(3).
Id. § 163A-1424(a)(4).
Id § 163A-1424(a)(5).
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One-time
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Required
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_______

Required
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filing

These disclosures are accomplished through a dizzying array of
forms.70 A complete periodic disclosure filing can sometimes comprise
nearly a dozen separate forms. The cover sheet has its own form." The
reconciliation page is a separate form.7 2 Contributions from individuals are

70. RequiredNC Campaign Reporting Forms, N.C. ST. BOARD OF ELECTIONS & ETHICS
Forms are available in both PDF and
https:/perma.cc/ESD2-TP27.
Microsoft Word format. See id Notably, the forms do not make use of either software's
ability to incorporate mathematical functions to eliminate the risk of human mathematical
errors. As an example of a reporting form that does make use of such mathematical
functions, see Form AOC-E-506, created by the Administrative Office of the Courts for use
in estate accountings. Account, AOC, https://perma.cc/Y8TF-BDYF.
71. Disclosure Report Cover, N.C. ST. BoARD OF ELECTIONS, https://perma.c/WMD5J7XE.
ENFORCEMENT,

72. DetailedSummary, N.C.

ST. BOARD OF ELECTIONS,
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reported on a different form than contributions from another campaign
committee, as are contributions from political parties.7 3
In-kind
74
contributions are reported separately from cash contributions.
Loans
obtained, repaid, and forgiven each require separate forms.75 Every form
must be independently totaled and reconciled by hand. It is possible to
submit a report whose receipts and expenditures do not balance with the
committee's reported cash on hand.76 No verifying information is required
unless the committee is selected for an audit. All of this complexity in
reporting serves to undermine the government's efforts to ensure that its
campaign finance laws are being followed and that voters are being
provided with accurate information about the funding of campaigns.
The efficacy of this disclosure system is further undermined by the
fact that it is decentralized. Candidates for local races file their reports
with county boards of election rather than with the State Board of
Elections, meaning that there are 101 separate repositories of campaign
finance data in the state.77 What's more, there is no vertical integration of
that data. Campaign finance reports filed at the county level stay there.7 8
The data is not forwarded to the State Board of Elections to be included in
its existing, searchable database. The result is that a voter who wants
access to the complete campaign contribution information for a given PAC
or individual would need to separately search all 101 repositories-a
cumbersome process that virtually prevents the free flow of information
that the law seeks to put in the hands of the electorate.

73. Contributions from
Individuals, N.C.
ST.
BOARD
OF
ELECTIONS,
https://perma.cc/R6QJ-EPL9; Contributions from Political Party Committees, N.C. ST.
BOARD OF ELECTIONS, https://perma.cc/CK5C-5KZQ; Contributions from Other Political
Committees, N.C. ST. BOARD OF ELECTIONS, https-//perma.ce/T889-KUWC.
74. In-Kind Contributions, N.C. ST. BOARD OF ELECTIONS, https://perma.cc/BX4EM7Z8.
75. Loan Proceeds,N.C. ST. BOARD OF ELECTIONS, https://perma.cc/F25M-YR33; Loan
Repayments, N.C. ST. BOARD OF ELECTIONS, https://perma.cc/6F36-M7YL; Forgiven Loans,
N.C. ST. BOARD OF ELECTIONS, https://perma.ccIP48M-UQ3E.
76. See supra note 70 for a discussion of the lack of mathematical functions in the State
Board of Election's computerized forms.
77. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163A-1495 to -1500 (2017); see also supra text
accompanying note 62 discussing the disclosure and filing requirements for candidates for
local offices.
78. See, e.g., Bd. of Elections, Campaign Finance Reports, WAKEGOV,
http://www.wakegov.com/elections/candidates/pages/reports.aspx
[https://perma.cc/E9ZE6CB2] (last updated Jan. 19, 2018).
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The Danger ofNoncompliance

Compliance with the statutory and regulatory framework is compelled
under penalty of both civil and criminal punishment. Any filing submitted
late or without required information is subject to fines of $250 per day, up
to a total of $10,000.79 The board is also authorized to assess civil penalties
against any person who accepts a contribution or makes an expenditure in
violation of the law.80 Before assessing such a penalty, the board is
required to "notify and consult with the district attorney" about possible
criminal prosecution for the violation.
Intentional violations of benign provisions of the scheme are
punishable as Class 2 misdemeanors, while offenses that more directly
impede the ability of the Board of Elections to trace the flow of money are
punishable as felonies. 82 So, intentionally failing to appoint a treasurer or
report the closure of the campaign committee is a Class 2 misdemeanor.83
Knowingly reporting false information to the Board of Elections is a Class
I felony,84 as is intentionally accepting anonymous contributions or
contributions from for-profit corporations. 85
These intentional or knowing violations of the law are appropriately
punished with criminal sanctions. But, can the same be said of violations
that are neither intentional nor knowing? The statute provides that the
Board of Elections "shall report" any violation to the appropriate district
attorney who "shall prosecute" the violation.8 6 The statute does not appear
to provide for the exercise of discretion on the part of the Board of
Elections or the district attorney, and there is no mens rea requirement."
The product of this incredibly intricate system, stitched together by
legislators, regulators, and the courts, is not an electoral system free from
the influence of big donors; it is an electoral system that silences everyday

79. § 160A-1451(a). The statute provides for civil penalties in the amount of $250 per
day for statewide races or $50 per day for any other race. Id The Board of Elections is
given the authority to "waive a late penalty if it determines there is good cause for the
waiver." Id
80. Id. § 160A-1451(b).
81. Id § 160A-1451(f.
82. Id §§ 160A-1445(a)-(c).
83. Id § 160A-1445(a).
84. Id. § 160A-1445(b).
85. Id. § 160A-1445(c).
86. Id §§ 160A-1445(d)-(e) (emphasis added). If the district attorney has not initiated
a prosecution within forty-five days, any voter in the district may petition the court for
appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute the allegation.
Id § 160A-1446(b).
87. See id. § 160A-1445.
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citizens who are unwilling to risk criminal punishment to participate in a
system they do not fully understand, while leaving them without adequate
information about the origins of campaign cash flowing through the state.
II. NORTH CAROLINA RIGHT TO LIFE, INC. V. LEA KE: DEFICIENCIES IN THE
FouRTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS

As written, North Carolina's campaign finance laws impose
significant burdens on political speech without accomplishing the
government's goals of limiting corruption and preventing circumvention of
the laws. Both the statutes and the disclosure system need to be pulled into
the twenty-first century. When such changes are made, they are likely to
face legal challenges. Unfortunately, the legal framework established by
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in North CarolinaRight to
Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL 111)88 is fraught with errors that would inhibit an
effective judicial review.
A.

The Challenges Brought by North CarolinaRight to Life, Inc.

The sweeping decision was handed down by the Fourth Circuit after a
non-profit organization and its affiliated PACs brought facial and asapplied challenges to a number of North Carolina's campaign finance
statutes. 89 The organizations argued they should not come within the ambit
of the law because their activities were not regulable.90
North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. (NCRL) asserted that it was not a
political committee and challenged the definition of "political committee"
on two bases.
First, it alleged the definition was vague because it
incorporated a subjective test that employed contextual factors open to a
broad range of interpretations. 91 Second, NCRL alleged the definition was
overbroad and would impose regulations on "organizations not primarily
focused on nominating and electing political candidates"92 because the
definition applied to organizations that had electioneering as "a major
purpose" rather than as "the major purpose." 9 3 The court agreed and held
both provisions facially unconstitutional.94

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

NCRL HI, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 278-79.
Id
Id at 281.
Id at 279.
Id at 286-87.
Id. at 308.
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The court's analysis was flawed. It failed to identify any sufficiently
important governmental interest, articulate a standard of review, or analyze
the burdens on unregulated speech. It chose instead to read the Supreme
Court's narrowing constructions of federal statutes as bright-line tests to be
applied to all campaign finance regulations." Judge Michael's dissenting
opinion was sharply critical of this approach and correctly noted that the
court employed the tests without properly balancing the burden imposed by
the law against the strength of the government's interest.9 6
B.

Failureto Articulate the Standard of Scrutiny

Departing from the familiar structure of constitutional analysis, the
court did not begin by identifying the burden imposed by the regulation on
free speech-whether the definition was used to restrict expenditures or
contributions or to require disclosures. Because it did not begin by
identifying the burden, it also failed to articulate the applicable standard of
scrutiny. This failure set the court on a course that avoided the typical
balancing of the government's interest and the burden on speech and
instead proceeded with application of bright-line tests.
A proper review would have begun by identifying that the definition
of "political committee" imposed both disclosure requirements (compelling
the speaker to divulge information that would otherwise be kept private)
and contribution limits (which constrain expressive association). The
former is subject to exacting judicial scrutiny while the latter is subject to
While the court agreed that the state had an
heightened scrutiny.

95. Id. at 282-83 (stating tests for the constitutional boundary of legislation in the realm
of campaign finance).
96. Id at 316 (Michael, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's adoption of "test[s]
without.. . a proper overbreadth analysis [which] considers the burden on First Amendment
rights as balanced against the strength of the governmental interest"). The majority
responded, "According to the dissent, the burdens imposed on political speech and the
state's interests may vary by the type of regulation.... The dissent would thus have us
uphold [the law] in full and wait to consider the constitutionality of each of its applications
in an as-applied fashion." Id at 299-300 (majority opinion). The majority mischaracterized
the dissent's position, which was that the court "must examine the degree to which the
regulation burdens First Amendment rights and evaluate whether the governmental interests
are sufficient to justify that burden." Id at 310 (Michael, J., dissenting).
97. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366-67 (2010). "Disclaimer and disclosure
requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they 'impose no ceiling on campaignrelated activities' and 'do not prevent anyone from speaking."' Id at 366 (internal citation
omitted) (first quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam); then quoting
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003), overruled in part on other grounds by Citizens
United, 558 U.S. 310). The requirements are therefore subject "to 'exacting scrutiny,'
which requires a 'substantial relation' between the disclosure requirement and a 'sufficiently
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"important governmental interest" in "limit[ing] the actuality and
appearance of corruption," it did not take the next step to determine
whether the statutes were either closely drawn to achieve that interest or at
least bore a substantial relation to it.98 The result following the opinion was
considerable confusion as to what level of scrutiny should be applied in
such cases within the circuit. 99
The court should have framed the questions at issue as: (1) whether
the definition of political committee, when used to impose contribution
limits, was closely drawn to achieve the substantially important
governmental interest of preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption, and (2) whether the definition, when used only to determine
who must register and file disclosures, bore a substantial relation to the
government's interest in providing information to the electorate and
preventing the circumvention of the law.
The court's overbreadth and vagueness analysis should then have been
framed within that context. Rather than proceeding through this type of
constitutional analysis, the court favored application of bright-line tests
when reviewing the statute's definition of express advocacy and its use of a
"major purpose" test.
C.

ErroneouslyApplying a Bright-Line Test to the Definition ofExpress
Advocacy

Classification as a "political committee" under the law was premised
on an organization engaging in express advocacy. 0 0 Consequently, the
court began by reviewing the state's attempt to define express advocacy
through the use of contextual factors.' 0 The definition at the time provided
that when a communication's "essential nature" was unclear, regulators
could consider contextual factors like the language, timing, distribution,
and cost of the ad to determine "whether the action urged could only be
important' governmental interest." Id at 366-67 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66).
"When the Government burdens the right to contribute, we apply heightened scrutiny,"
which is met when the government demonstrates that the statute is "'closely drawn' to
match a 'sufficiently important interest."' McConnell, 540 U.S. at 231-32 (quoting FEC v.
Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 162 (2003)).
98. NCRL HI, 525 F.3d at 281 (alteration in original) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26).
99. Hillary Kies, Note, Preston v. Leake: Applying the Appropriate Standardof Review
to North Carolina's Campaign Contributions Ban, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 875, 886-87
(2012).
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.14A (2007) (amended and transferred to § 163A-1429
(2017)); see supra discussion in Section I.B.
101. NCRL III, 525 F.3d at 283. North Carolina's "context prong" allowed for a
communication to be evaluated in light of its timing, content, reach, and cost. Id. at 283-84.
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interpreted by a reasonable person as advocating the nomination, election,
or defeat of that candidate."1 0 2
The court held that the statute was facially unconstitutional not
because it was overbroad in light of the government's interests but because
it did not match exactly the FEC's definition of "electioneering
communication."'1 0 3 That definition had recently been upheld by the
Supreme Court in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL 11).104 The
WRTL H Court considered an as-applied challenge to a federal regulation
electioneering
producing
from
corporations
that
prohibited
5 The plaintiffs in that case had run a television ad that
0
communications.
urged voters to "[c]ontact Senators Feingold and Kohl and tell them to
oppose the filibuster" of several judicial nominees. 106 The ad was aired
within thirty days of the election and therefore fell within the ambit of a
federal law that regulated "electioneering communications."'0 The Court
determined that the purpose of the statute was to regulate communications
that were the functional equivalent of express advocacy, those that were
"susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote
for or against a specific candidate." 108 The Court held that the ads
produced by the plaintiff were not the "functional equivalent of express
advocacy" within the meaning of the statute and that the statute had been
improperly applied to those communications. 0 9
In reaching this conclusion, the Court, in dicta, stressed that while
courts may consider background information "to put an ad in context," they
should avoid using "contextual factors" in the judicial inquiry to ensure that
such challenges do not "become an excuse for discovery or a broader
10 The Court was not suggesting that it would be unconstitutional
inquiry."o
102. § 163-278.14A(a)(2) (2007).
103. NCRL III, 525 F.3d at 290.
104. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL 1l), 551 U.S. 449 (2007).

105. Id at 455-56.
106. Id at 458-59.
107. Id. at 460.
108. Id. at 469-70.
109. Id at 470. The Court determined that the ads were issue ads, not express advocacy
or its functional equivalent, because they "focus[ed] on a legislative issue, t[ook] a position
on the issue, exhort[ed] the public to adopt that position, and urge[d] the public to contact
public officials with respect to the matter" but "d[id] not mention an election, candidacy,
political party, or challenger" or "take a position on a candidate's character, qualifications,
or fitness for office." Id
110. Id. at 473-74. The Court indicated it would be permissible for courts to consider,
for instance, whether the ad "describes a legislative issue" currently being or likely to soon
be considered by the legislature. Id at 474 (quoting Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC (WRTL
1), 466 F. Supp. 2d 195, 207 (D.D.C. 2006)). However, the Court indicated that, when
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for legislatures to define the functional equivalent of express advocacy
using such factors. Rather, courts asked to determine whether an ad
constituted the functional equivalent of express advocacy should avoid
imposing such factors because consideration of such factors was
unnecessary in light of the regulation's very clear definition."'
The Fourth Circuit relied on the WRTL II decision and articulated a
new two-pronged test for determining whether a communication was the
"functional equivalent of express advocacy," notwithstanding the
legislature's own definition. The court held that the state may regulate
communications as the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if
such communications: (1) "qualify as an 'electioneering communication,'
defined by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ('BCRA') as a
'broadcast, cable, or satellite communication' that refers to a 'clearly
identified candidate' within sixty days of a general election or thirty days
of a primary election,"112 and (2) are "only ... susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate.""'
The court applied its newly articulated test and struck North
Carolina's definition as vague and overbroad on its face because it relied
on contextual factors and did not exactly match the definition laid out in the
federal regulations." 4
This interpretation-that a statutory functional equivalent test must
not contain subjective factors-is at odds with other courts that have
upheld the use of contextual factors in similar statutory tests, and in some
cases even supplied them.' For instance, the Vermont Supreme Court
upheld that state's expansive definition of electioneering communications
by supplying a narrowing construction that allowed consideration of

considering an as-applied challenge, the inquiry should not revolve around other contextual
factors such as the amount of money spent on the production of an ad, the number of times
the ad was aired, or specific dates on which it was aired because such inquiry would lead to
more protracted litigation. Id. at 473-74.
111. Id.
112. NCRL II, 525 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted) (citing
WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 474 n.7). The court interpreted the footnote as "stating that a
communication must meet the 'brightline requirements' of the [federal regulation's]
definition of 'electioneering communication' to be regulable as the 'functional equivalent of
express advocacy."' Id (quoting WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 474 n.7).
113. Id. (quoting WRTL II, 551 U.S at 469-70).
114. Id at 284-85.
115. Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 135, 139 (2d Cir. 2014) (adopting
the narrowing construction supplied by the Vermont Supreme Court and upholding the
definition against vagueness and overbreadth challenges).
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contextual factors almost identical to those struck down in NCRL 111.116
The Vermont court held that "the objective observer should look to
multiple factors: for example, the timing. . . , the images used . . ., the tone

...
. the audience to which the advertisement is targeted, and the
prominence of the issue(s) discussed."'1 7 If the conclusion of the objective
observer is "that the purpose of an advertisement is to influence voters to
vote yes or no on a candidate," the communication is constitutionally
regulable as the functional equivalent of express advocacy.' 8 The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals similarly upheld a provision of Illinois's
campaign finance regulations specifically because it was limited by the
same five criteria: medium, cost, timing, distribution, and content." 9
The dissent in NCRL III rightly noted that the language of WRTL H
was not intended to create a bright-line test to which all such regulations
must conform.1 2 0 Rather, it affirmed the application of a regulation that set
out sufficiently precise boundaries to achieve the government's interest
without burdening speech that did not need to be regulated to achieve that
interest.121 The WRTL II Court did not articulate a constitutional standard
beyond which the government dare not regulate. Rather, it reaffirmed that
the government's definition was sufficiently precise to withstand strict
scrutiny when applied to express advocacy or its functional equivalent.1 22
The court then applied the definition to determine that the plaintiffs ads
were neither express advocacy nor its functional equivalent and that the
regulation had been improperly applied to those "issue" ads.1 2 3 The result
was that the application of the law was found unconstitutional, not that the
law itself was unconstitutional.1 2 4 And the Court certainly did not go so far
as to say that the federal regulation was the only constitutional means of
regulating ads that are the functional equivalent of express advocacy.
Application of this new bright-line standard in the Fourth Circuit was
unwieldy for the district courts. Only three years later in a similar

116. State v. Green Mountain Future, 86 A.3d 981, 998 (Vt. 2013).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 485 (7th Cir. 2012); see also
Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that failure to include a temporal
limit or exclude print media did not render a statute unconstitutionally overbroad).
120. NCRL III, 525 F.3d 274, 323 (4th Cir. 2008) (Michael, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 316 (Michael, J., dissenting) ("The majority clearly err[ed] by mandating the
elements of [the federal law], which [was] simply an example of a clear and sufficiently
tailored statute, as an essential part of any campaign regulation.").
122. WRTL II, 551 U.S. 449, 465 (2007).

123. Id. at 481.
124. Id.
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challenge, the Fourth Circuit abandoned the test it had articulated in NCRL
III, holding that a state may regulate any communication that "is
susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote
for or against a specific candidate."l 2 5
The court also overturned a district court decision the following year
where that court had applied exactly the test articulated in NCRL JJ.126 But
the damage to North Carolina's campaign finance regulations had already
been done. Using the WRTL II decision as a bright-line test steered the
court away from a proper constitutional analysis and struck what was likely
a perfectly legitimate regulation of the functional equivalent of express
advocacy.
D.

ErroneouslyApplying Buckley's "MajorPurpose"Language as a
Test

The court also erred when it applied the language of Buckley v.
Valeol 2 7 to North Carolina's "major purpose" test. NCRL asserted that the
definition of "political committee" was unconstitutionally overbroad
because it subjected organizations to regulation even when express
advocacy was among several "major purposes" rather than the sole major
purpose.1 28 NCRL argued that Buckley permitted only "the regulation of
entities that have the major purpose of supporting or opposing a
candidate."1 29
The court agreed and interpreted Buckley as mandating that campaign
finance laws could reach "only entities 'under the control of a candidate or
the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a
candidate."'1 30 But this interpretation was in error. The Buckley Court

125. Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. FEC, 681 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting
WRTL 17, 551 U.S. at 470) (reversing a lower court decision that applied the NCRL III test to
hold an FEC regulation unconstitutionally vague and overbroad).
126. Ctr. for Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Tennant, 706 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2013)
(reversing the Southern District of West Virginia, which held West Virginia's definition of
express advocacy was unconstitutionally overbroad because it failed the NCRL III test, and
instead applying the "appeal to vote" test). The district court in Tennant held that, under the
"appeal to vote" test, a statute would come "within the confines of the BCRA's
'electioneering communication' definition" and "survive vagueness challenges only when
[it] reach[ed] communications that (1) are disseminated via cable, broadcast, or satellite; (2)
refer to a clearly identified candidate; (3) are disseminated within certain time periods
before an election; and (4) are directed at the relevant electorate." Id. at 280.
127. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
128. NCRL III, 525 F.3d 282, 287-88 (4th Cir. 2008).
129. Id. at 287.
13 0. Id.
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only narrowed the scope of the federal regulation before it. 13 1 It did not
hold that the Constitution erected a boundary there. Rather, it held that the
federal law's definition of "political committee" only needed to encompass
those "major purpose" organizations to fulfill the purposes of the law. 132
When Vermont Right to Life Committee attempted to make the same
argument in a challenge to Vermont's campaign finance law, it was
soundly rejected by the Second Circuit, which stated: "When the Buckley
Court construed the relevant federal statute to reach only groups having
'the major purpose' of electing a candidate, it was drawing a statutory line.
It was not holding that the Constitution forbade any regulations from going
further." 1 3 3 Much like its application of a bright-line test to the definition
of express advocacy, the application of Buckley as a bright-line test allowed
the court to skip over the significant and meaningful constitutional analysis
it should have undertaken.
E.

Failureto DistinguishFourteenthAmendment Vagueness

Finally, the court failed to analyze the separate vagueness issues
raised under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, instead lumping them
together in one "overbreadth and vagueness" analysis.134 When a statute is
challenged for overbreadth under the First Amendment and for vagueness
under both the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the three doctrines are
sometimes applied together to determine whether protected speech is
"chilled"; that is, whether an average person, faced with a potentially
sweeping, difficult-to-interpret statute, which may be applied against him,

131. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79-80.
132. Id.
133. Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 136 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal
citation omitted). The Fourth and Tenth Circuits are the only two circuit courts to decide
otherwise in the wake of McConnell, perhaps because the sweeping decision, issued by a
fractured Supreme Court, fundamentally changed the understanding of the Buckley holding.
Compare Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182, 1200 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding a Hawaiian
statute that applied to any organization with "the purpose" of influencing an election), Ctr.
for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 487-88 (7th Cir. 2012) (declining to
strike Illinois statute which did not include "the major purpose" test), and Nat'1 Org. for
Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 59 (1st Cir. 2011) (upholding a statute which regulated
"non-major purpose" organizations which spent or received more than $5,000 per year for
the purpose of influencing an election), with N.M. Youth Organized v. Herrera, 611 F.3d
669, 677-78 (10th Cir. 2010) (invalidating New Mexico's disclosure law because it
regulated beyond the bounds of the "major purpose" test).
134. NCRL III, 525 F.3d at 283-84 (holding contextual factors were "clearly
'susceptible' to multiple interpretations" and "provide[d] neither fair warning to speakers
... nor sufficient direction to regulators as to what constitute[d] political speech").
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might simply choose not to speak.1s But the combined analysis, as
undertaken by the NCRL court, leads to confusion. It is difficult to
determine which doctrine was really at the heart of the statute's
constitutional infirmity.
North Carolina's definition of express advocacy was an attempt to
avoid invalidation under the Fourteenth Amendment's vagueness doctrine.
The statute employed the phrase "to support or oppose the nomination or
election" to delineate when a thing of value is a "contribution" or
"expenditure" within the ambit of the statute.1 36 It could simply have left
the statute at that, allowing the reader to interpret what. "to support or
oppose" might mean, but it went further, providing a definition of evidence
that would indicate an expenditure was indeed made to support or oppose a
candidate. It did so by incorporating a modified version of Buckley's
magic-words test and employing an alternative, context-based test.137
The Supreme Court, faced with interpreting a similar definition in
McConnell v. FEC, held that words such as "support," "oppose,"
"promote," and "attack" are sufficiently clear, are not vague, and need no
further explication for the statute to be valid.' 3 1 It is difficult to reconcile
the Fourth Circuit's assertion that the legislature's extra step of providing
clarifying language somehow made the phrase "to support or oppose" more
vague than the phrases considered by the Supreme Court in McConnell.
Perhaps it is because the court decided, without articulating, that those
words were vague under the First Amendment, not the Fourteenth. The
court decided not that the words themselves were ambiguous and capable
of multiple understandings or definitions but that they allowed for a
regulator to exercise an impermissible level of discretion in determining
when the statute should be applied and when it should not.1 39

135. Madigan, 697 F.3d at 479 (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
216 (1975)) (reasoning that even in the context of a First Amendment challenge, "the
potential chilling effect on protected expression must be both 'real and substantial' to
invalidate a statute as void for vagueness in a facial challenge").
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163A-1411, -1429 (2017); see supra discussion accompanying
notes 39-41.
137. § 163-278.14A (2007) (amended and transferred to § 163A-1429 (2017)).
138. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 170 n.64 (2003), overruled in part on other
grounds by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Other districts interpreting
similar provisions following McConnell have upheld statutes against vagueness challenges.
See Yamada, 786 F.3d at 1193-94; Vt. Right to Life Comm., 758 F.3d at 128-30; Ctr. for
Individual Freedom v. Tennant, 706 F.3d 270, 286-87 (4th Cir. 2013); Madigan, 697 F.3d
at 485-86; McKee, 649 F.3d at 64.
139. NCRL III, 525 F.3d at 283.
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The Need to Abandon the Precedent

At the time of the NCRL challenge, North Carolina's statute had a
clear definition used to distinguish entities engaged in electoral advocacy
from entities engaged in issue advocacy.140 The statute employed a twoprong test that captured entities engaged in express advocacy as well as
those who might resort to the functional equivalent of express advocacy to
skirt the law. 14 1 In its review of the statute, the Fourth Circuit failed to
follow a proper constitutional analysis.14 2 It did not articulate the standard
of scrutiny. 143 It improperly adopted the federal government's definition of
"electioneering communication" as a judicial test.1 44 It misinterpreted the
Buckley Court's narrowing construction as creating another bright-line
"major purpose" test to which all statutes should conform. 145 Had the court
properly identified the burden, applied the correct standard of scrutiny, and
balanced the burden on protected political speech against the government's
interest in regulating campaign finance, it might well have found that the
statute was, in fact, constitutional on its face.
This flawed analysis left tremendous confusion in its wake. District
courts bound by the precedent were forced to apply the bright-line BCRA
test, as well as the "major purpose" test.1 46 And, even though the Fourth
Circuit reversed those decisions, it did so without overruling NCRL III. As
a result, the decision remains binding precedent for future challenges to
North Carolina's campaign finance regulations. But, stare decisis does not
require that the court continue to blindly follow improperly reasoned
precedent. Just as a row of stitches must sometimes be ripped out to create
a proper seam, the Fourth Circuit's NCRL III decision should be ripped
from the circuit's jurisprudence and replaced with a proper constitutional
analysis.

140. § 163-278.14A (2007) (amended and transferred to § 163A-1429 (2017)).
141. Id.
142. See discussion of Judge Michael's dissent at supra note 96.
143. NCRL III, 525 F.3d at 310-11 (Michael, J., dissenting).
144. Id at 315.
145. Id
146. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 736 (E.D. Va. 2011), aff'd
sub nom Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. FEC, 681 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2012); Ctr. for
Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Ireland, 613 F. Supp. 2d 777 (S.D. W. Va. 2009), affd in part,
rev'd in partsub nom. Ctr. for Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Tennant, 706 F. 3d 270 (4th Cir.
2013).
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M. FRAMEWORK FOR A COMPLETE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

Future challenges to North Carolina's statutes are inevitable. Even if
the legislature doesn't act to update the outdated statutes and outmoded
regulations, the statutory scheme remains susceptible to a constitutional
challenge.
The Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United left
unresolved the question of whether a statute that discriminates on the basis
of the speaker's identity (for instance, by prohibiting contributions to
candidates by for-profit corporations) would survive challenges under the
First or Fourteenth Amendments. 14 7 This Part will provide a suggested
framework for the court to use in the event it is asked to evaluate one or
more components of North Carolina's statutory scheme in the future, rather
than employing the tests articulated in NCRL JJ.148
A.

Selecting the Appropriate ConstitutionalBalancing Test

The court must begin by identifying the type of burden placed on
speech in order to apply the appropriate level of review in its analysis.
Campaign finance regulations typically break into three familiar categories:
(1) those that directly limit speech and expressive conduct by imposing
limits on expenditures; 149 (2) those that regulate expressive association and

147. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 364-65 (2010) (holding "[t]he First
Amendment does not permit Congress to ... suppress political speech on the basis of the
speaker's corporate identity"); see also, e.g, Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v.
Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 879 n.12 (8th Cir. 2012) (noting "Citizens United's outright
rejection of the government's anti-distortion rationale, as well as the Court's admonition
'that the State cannot exact as the price of [state-conferred corporate] advantages the
forfeiture of First Amendment rights' (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted)
(quoting Citizens Unite4, 558 U.S. at 351)).
148. While it is beyond the scope of this Comment to fully discuss justiciability
concerns, it is worth noting differences recognized in campaign finance challenges. For
instance, a plaintiff who can show it has self-censored its speech may have standing even
though a statute has not been enforced against it. See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679
F.3d 583, 590-91 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that a "plaintiff must show 'an intention to
engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed
by a statute, and. . . a credible threat of prosecution thereunder"' (quoting Babbitt v. United
Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979))). Even when a plaintiff has engaged
in some activity allowed by the statute, it may bring a challenge for actions it did not take
for fear of prosecution. See Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 50 (1st Cir.
2011) (rejecting the government's argument that "a 'plaintiff who engages in some conduct
that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the
conduct of others' (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 18-19
(2010))).
149. See, e.g., WRTL II, 551 U.S. 449, 479 (2007) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute
that regulated expenditure by non-profit corporations).
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conduct by placing limits on campaign contributions;15 0 and (3) those that
compel the disclosure of information."' Regulations limiting expenditures
must survive strict scrutiny,152 those limiting contributions must survive
"heightened" scrutiny,13 and those requiring disclosures must survive a
lesser "exacting" scrutiny.154 Wel a statute's definition is used to impose
several types of burdens, like North Carolina's political committee
definition, the court should review the definition separately in the context
of each application.
Having identified the type of regulation at issue, the court must next
determine that the government interest advanced by the regulation is
sufficiently important to justify the burden on speech. The Supreme Court
has held that preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance and
preventing circumvention of regulations are the only sufficiently important
government interests that would justify the imposition of contribution or
expenditure limits.'5 5 The Court has characterized this interest as primarily
being the prevention of quid pro quo bribery, wherein a donation is made to
a candidate with the expectation that favorable government action will flow
to the donor after the candidate is elected.1 56 The Court has also recognized
the government's interest in providing information to the electorate and in
150. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1445 (2014) (declining to "revisit Buckley's
distinction between contributions and expenditures and the corollary distinction in the
applicable standards of review").
151. McKee, 649 F.3d at 55 (applying exacting scrutiny to a statute which required
The court in McKee stated, "Since Buckley, the Supreme Court has
disclosure).
distinguished ... between laws that restrict 'the amount of money a person or group can
spend on political communication' and laws that simply require disclosure ... ." Id
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam)).
152. WRTL H, 551 U.S. at 464; McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003), overruled
in part on other grounds by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310; FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life,
Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 252 (1986); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45.
153. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 144.
154. McKee, 649 F.3d at 55-56.
155. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441-42. At various times, the Court has also
recognized that contribution limits might be justified by other governmental interests. See,
e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(noting the government's strong interest in democratizing the influence of money in
elections); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)
(identifying for the first time that the government has an interest in preventing "the
corrosive and distorting effects" of aggregated wealth flowing into campaigns), overruled by
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365; Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934)
(recognizing the government's interest in safeguarding the electoral process). The Court
soundly rejected these other goals in McCutcheon and held "[a]ny regulation must instead
target what we have called 'quidpro quo' corruption or its appearance." McCutcheon, 134
S. Ct. at 1441.
15 6. Id.
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gathering information to facilitate enforcement, and circuits around the
country have nearly uniformly used this interest as sufficient justification to
uphold disclosure and disclaimer requirements.' 57
After determining the government's purpose and its interest in
achieving that purpose, the court must determine whether the law at issue
actually accomplishes that purpose and whether it was drawn precisely
enough to protect speech the government does not need to regulate to
achieve that purpose. The critical inquiry is whether the statute or
regulation has been drawn closely enough to achieve the government's
stated purpose without unduly burdening the ability of the public to freely
associate, pool resources, amplify individuals' voices, and engage
meaningfully in the political process.
1.

Strict Scrutiny Applied to Expenditure Limits

Regulations that limit expenditures must survive strict scrutiny.158
The government must show that the statute or regulation is narrowly
tailored to achieve the government's interest in preventing corruption.159
While direct limitations have not been allowed since Buckley, the law may
impose indirect limits to prevent circumvention of the law, for instance by
treating coordinated expenditures as contributions and thereby subjecting
them to limitations. 6 o The Supreme Court has upheld such regulations as a

157. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369 (recognizing that (1) "the public has an interest in
knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election" and (2) providing
this information to the public is a sufficiently important government interest); Buckley, 424
U.S. at 66-67 (recognizing that disclosure laws further the government's sufficiently
important interests in deterring actual corruption, avoiding the appearance of corruption, and
"provid[ing] the electorate with information 'as to where political campaign money comes
from and how it is spent"' (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-564, at 4 (1971))); see also
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196; First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92
(1978).
158. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (holding that
a law imposing expenditure limits on political parties could not survive strict scrutiny); FEC
v. Nat'1 Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (declaring expenditure limit on PACs
unconstitutional).
159. WRTL II, 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007).
160. CompareMcConnell, 540 U.S. at 205 ("[Rjecent cases have recognized that certain
restrictions on corporate electoral involvement permissibly hedge against 'circumvention of
[valid] contribution limits."' (second alteration in original) (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 539
U.S. 146, 155 (2003)), with WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 479 (declining to recognize the anticircumvention interest to justify application of a statute prohibiting a non-profit from airing

issue ads). The Court in WRTL II acknowledged that there is a limit to how far the anticircumvention interest can be extended. Id. (stating that "such a prophylaxis-uponprophylaxis approach to regulating expression is not consistent with strict scrutiny").
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valid means of preventing circumvention.1 6 1 It has, however, struck such
regulations when they were applied to independent expenditures that did
not pose the same risk of corruption. 16 2
2.

HeightenedScrutiny Applied to ContributionLimits

Regulations that impose contribution limits must survive heightened
scrutiny, which requires that the statute be "closely drawn" to match the
government's interest in "preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption."163 Limitations on donations to candidates and parties can
prevent quid pro quo corruption by limiting the amount of financial interest
connecting a donor and candidate. 16 4 The further removed the candidate
and donor are the more likely the government will need to rely on its
interest in preventing the appearance of corruption-that is, preventing the
public's perception that a quid pro quo arrangement has occurred.16 1
Whether such limitations survive heightened scrutiny will frequently
depend on the identities of the contributor and recipient. The limitation
will be most effective-and the regulation more closely drawn-when it
prevents large financial contributions directly to a candidate from any
source. Limitations applied to political parties rather than candidates are
somewhat less effective because they are an intermediary between the
donor and candidate. 16 6 Political parties use their resources to support a
wide array of candidates, usually from diverse regions within a state and in
different branches of government. Donations to the political parties are
necessarily less likely to have the same kind of corrupting influence as
donations made directly to a candidate.
The same logic leads to the conclusion that limitations on
contributions to Super PACs are less likely to prevent quid pro quo
161. FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 465 (2001)
(holding coordinated expenditures may be limited to minimize circumvention of
contribution limits).
162. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357 (concluding "independent expenditures, including
those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption").
163. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 173 (applying heightened scrutiny to regulation that limited
campaign contributions); Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162 (requiring that regulations limiting
contributions be "closely drawn to match a sufficiently important interest" (internal
quotations and citations omitted)); see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,
386-88 (2000).
164. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 182 (holding that a ban on "soft-money" contributions was
closely drawn to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption).
165. Id. at 136.
166. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1452 (2014) (reasoning that when money
flows through independent actors, such as political parties, the risk of quid pro quo
corruption is lower).
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corruption, and thus less likely to survive the heightened scrutiny standard.
When expenditures are not coordinated with the campaign, they have less
value to the candidate, and the principals in the Super PAC are less likely
to be accorded special favors by the candidate once elected (at least in
theory). 1 6 7 Additionally, quid pro quo corruption requires prior subjective
agreement, which cannot legally occur between a Super PAC and a.
candidate because, by definition, the Super PAC is prohibited from telling
the candidate that it plans to assist the campaign. 16 8
However, prior subjective agreement is not the only way that
corruption or the appearance of corruption might occur. Let us return to
our earlier example and imagine that John Hancock would like to support
Ben in his run for state senate. He could contribute (i) $5,200 to Ben in
both the primary and general election, (ii) an unlimited amount to the state
party, (iii) $5,200 to the Senate caucus of Ben's party in both the primary
and general election, and (iv) $5,200 to other candidates in Ben's party
who don't have competitive races and can themselves contribute the
maximum amount to Ben. This allows him to legally direct far more than
the maximum allowable $10,400 to the candidate and makes it even more
difficult to follow the flow of the money from the donor to the candidate.
Imagine then that Ben, who is fully aware of all of these legal
donations, learns that Hancock has established a Super PAC. Does it really
matter that they don't collaborate on the exact mailers to be sent by the
PAC to potential voters? Ben knows that the Super PAC is supporting him.
If the contribution limit is intended to prevent corruption by ensuring that
an individual is not able to contribute a "corruptible" amount of money to
Ben, does this system really accomplish the government's goal?
The court must carefully connect the limitation imposed to the
government's interest in preventing not only outright corruption but also in
preventing the appearance of corruption or the circumvention of the law.
To the extent that a donor is able to easily circumvent the regulation by
spending unlimited funds on behalf of a particular candidate, the
government's interest may be undermined, thereby rendering the regulation
underinclusive.

167. FEC v. Nat'1 Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 497-98 (1985). In discussing the
potential for corruption, the Court stated:
The fact that candidates and elected officials may alter or reaffirm their own
positions on issues in response to political messages paid for by the PACs can
hardly be called corruption, for one of the essential features of democracy is the
presentation to the electorate of varying points of view.
Id. at 498.
168. See supra Section I.B.
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Exacting Scrutiny Applied to DisclosureLaws

Regulations requiring disclosure must survive exacting scrutiny. 1 69
Providing information to the electorate is a "sufficiently important"
governmental interest to justify the imposition of disclosure laws, as is its
interest in preventing circumvention of the law by gathering information to
enable enforcement. 7 e While the law need not be narrowly tailored or
even closely drawn, the government must show that it bears a substantial
relation to those interests. 1 7 1
It is not enough to simply say that the public has an interest in
knowing the information. The government must show that the public has
an interest in receiving the particular information it compels to be
disclosed. 172 The court should also consider whether the government has
shown that the information it gathers is actually made available to the
public in a meaningful way and in a timely fashion to enable the public to
evaluate the expenditures of money for campaign purposes prior to an
election. The regulation can only bear a "substantial relation" to the
government's interest if it is actually providing relevant information to
voters prior to the election or using the disclosed information to enforce
existing regulations and prevent circumvention. 173 While regulations in
this context rarely fail due to overbreadth or vagueness, it is possible that a
court could find that a regulation does not actually further the government's
interest because it fails to capture enough relevant information, or because
the government fails to make that information available to the public, or
because the government fails to make meaningful use of the information
once it has been disclosed.
B.

FirstAmendment OverbreadthAnalysis

After determining that the regulation is a justifiable means of
furthering the state's interest, the court must determine whether the actual
application of the statute is overbroad-that is, whether it has the potential

169. See supra note 97 and accompanying text; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
64 (1978) (stating that disclosure laws must survive exacting scrutiny).
170. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66.
171. Id at 64.
172. Id. (stating that there must "be a 'relevant correlation' or 'substantial relation'
between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed" (first
quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 525 (1960); then quoting Gibson v. Fla.
Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963))).
173. Id. at 66-68.
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to sweep within its ambit too much protected speech.174 The overbreadth
doctrine is focused not on whether the statute is capable of achieving the
government's interest, but rather on whether the government could employ
narrower means to do so and thereby impose a lesser burden on protected
speech. The Supreme Court has held that overbreadth is a "strong
medicine" to be applied with hesitation and has consequently required that
a statute must be substantially overbroad to justify being invalidated for
overbreadth."'
Substantial overbreadth occurs when a statute poses a realistic danger
of burdening "a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech." 17 6
This analysis requires the court to conceive of every type of speech which
may be regulated by the law and then analyze (1) how regulation of that
speech is related to the government's stated interest, and (2) whether the
burden of the regulation imposed might be so severe that it keeps the public
from engaging in political discourse."'
The amount of protected speech that may be swept within the ambit of
the statute without rendering it unconstitutionally overbroad is correlated to
the severity of the burden imposed. When the state imposes expenditure
limits, the statute must be narrowly tailored to avoid regulating protected
speech at all, if possible. On the other hand, when the state seeks only to
compel disclosure of information about speech rather than limiting the
ability to speak, the law may burden a significant amount of protected
speech and remain constitutional, because the burden imposed is so much
less severe. It may be helpful to think of the regulation as a dart and
protected speech as the concentric circles on the dart board. When the law
requires disclosure, the government may win if its dart lands anywhere on
the board, but as the burden on speech becomes more severe, the

174. Iowa Right to Life Comm. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576, 590 (8th Cir. 2013) (discussing
extensively the disagreement among circuits as to whether "exacting scrutiny" requires
narrow tailoring).
175. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982). "[T]he overbreadth doctrine is
'strong medicine' and [we] have employed it with hesitation, and then 'only as a last resort.'
We have, in consequence, insisted that the overbreadth involved be 'substantial' before the
statute involved will be invalidated on its face." Id (citation omitted) (quoting Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
176. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1987).
177. See, e.g., id (holding a city ordinance unconstitutional because it did not allow "the
'breathing space' that 'First Amendment freedoms need to survive"' (quoting NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963))); see also ERWIN CHIMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 11.2 (5th ed. 2015). Relying on City of Houston v. Hill, Professor Chimerinsky notes
"that substantial overbreadth might be demonstrated by showing a significant number of
situations where a law could be applied to prohibit constitutionally protected speech." Id
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government must aim closer for the center. When it imposes expenditure
limits, it only wins if it hits the bullseye.
C. FirstAmendment Vagueness Analysis
Even if the court finds that the law is adequately tailored to
accomplish its purpose, it may still violate the First Amendment by
allowing the government to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.17 The
question for the court in reviewing a statute for vagueness under the First
Amendment is whether the statute relies on standards that allow a regulator
to justify a different application of the law to similar speakers or
messages.' 79 A law which relies on wholly subjective standards may leave
resulting in viewpoint
room for discriminatory enforcement,
the law sets out
determine
whether
discrimination. The court must
sufficiently precise guidance to ensure that decisions about enforcement
will not be based on the viewpoint of the speaker. This review is based
largely on the level of discretion given to the regulator, but also has in view
the effect that such a subjective standard might have on the speaker who,
unable to determine whether a regulator might enforce the law against him
after he speaks, decides not to speak at all. This is particularly worrisome
where a law regulating speech imposes criminal penalties, as is the case
with North Carolina's campaign finance laws.
D.

FourteenthAmendment Vagueness Analysis

Because criminal penalties may increase the chilling effect on
protected speech, courts frequently choose to combine the vagueness
analysis under the First Amendment with the due process analysis under
the Fourteenth Amendment, but this is not particularly helpful. In the
context of the First Amendment, the vagueness inquiry seeks to ensure that
speakers are not forced to guess at the application and enforcement of a
statute by a regulator. 80 In the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
178. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (stating that in order to
avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, "laws must provide explicit standards for
those who apply them")
179. Id.; see also Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002). Although the court in
Thomas was considering a regulation that authorized issuance of permits for use of a public
park, its reasoning is also applicable here. The Court held that "[w]here the licensing
official enjoys unduly broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a permit,
there is a risk that he will favor or disfavor speech based on its content." Id at 323.
Therefore, the Court required that a "regulation contain adequate standards to guide the
official's decision." Id
180. See, e.g., Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 62 (1st Cir. 2011) (stating
that "the doctrine seeks to . .. prevent 'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement' of laws by
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vagueness inquiry seeks to ensure that the meaning of the words used in the
statute are not susceptible of multiple interpretations, that is, that they give
adequate notice to individuals of what behaviors are punishable.18 ' Laws
are impermissibly vague if they fail to "give [a] person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited." 182 If the
law employs words with clear meaning, it will not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process as a result of vagueness.
CONCLUSION

The result of the current campaign finance regime in North Carolina is
that those with access to knowledgeable attorneys and accountants have a
great deal more freedom to engage in political speech than those who do
not. Even worse, the regulatory scheme is so fragmented and ineffectual
that it no longer serves the government's interests in regulating campaign
finance.
Circumvention, obfuscation, and erroneous reporting are
common.18 3 It is hard to imagine that this complex system of categorizing
speech and speakers is accomplishing its purposes without drastically
chilling political speech, which is why it is even more critical that the court
be very precise in its analysis of the legislature's attempts to regulate
campaign finance.
The public's trust in our electoral system is eroding, and the
legislature should act to update the laws and give them new teeth, and it
should do so soon. When it does, and when the court is inevitably asked to
once again evaluate the campaign finance scheme, the court should be as
deliberate as possible, following a methodical framework to lay out its
requiring that they 'provide explicit standards for those who apply them"' (quoting
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108)); United States v. Hussein, 351 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating
that a "statute is susceptible to [a vagueness] attack if it ... prohibits or requires the
performance of an act in terms so uncertain that persons of average intelligence would have
no choice but to guess at its meaning").
181. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108 (stating that a statute or regulation "is void for vagueness
if its prohibitions are not clearly defined").
182. Id For a thorough discussion of the two types of vagueness challenges, see Ctr. for
Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Tennant, 849 F. Supp. 2d 659, 671-72 (S.D. W. Va. 2011);
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 18-21 (2010).
183. See Craig Jarvis, Watchdog Group Calls on Sen Hise to Recuse Himself over
Campaign Finance Accusations, NEWS & OBSERVER (May 9, 2017, 7:18 PM),
https://perma.cc/8ZAR-2DAE; Nick Ochsner, FBI to Probe Top House Republicans After
31, 2015, 4:49 PM),
(Dec.
WBTV Investigation, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER
https://perma.cc/43XE-VLF7; Travis Fain, Berger's Campaign Audited Forfeits $5,500,
WRAL (Aug. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/3V8R-MEP4; Jim Morrill, Charlotte Democratic
Lawmaker's Unreported Campaign Contributions Prompt State Review, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (Nov. 16, 2017, 11:30 AM), https://perma.cc/5L5X-CKCK.
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decision so that it may be properly applied by the legislature when it once
again responds with statutory revisions. Those statutory revisions are
sorely needed, whether as a result of judicial action, or on the legislature's
own initiative. The current scheme-rather than rooting out corruption and
influence-appears to have the opposite effect: those with the most money
are able to manipulate the law to get their message out to the public and
their interests in front of elected officials, while those without such
resources are silenced by the fear of prosecution lest they run afoul of this
complex system of regulation and be subjected to criminal penalties. It is
the difference between being given a megaphone and being given a kazoo.
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